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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the great legacies of the New Haven School was its early
recognition of the tremendous dynamism and complexity of the international
lawmaking process. Its proponents wisely rejected both Austinian positivism
and the traditional conception of "law" as a dichotomy of "national" and
"international" legal rules. Instead, the policy-oriented jurisprudence of the
New Haven School recognized and embraced the interactivity of a multiplicity
of decisionmakers in shaping the international legal regime.' Moreover, in
defining law as an iterative process of authoritative decisionmaking, the New
Haven School recognized that authoritative decisions need not necessarily
come from official bodies such as courts, tribunals, or legislatures. Instead, its
proponents argued, international law should be understood as a policymaking
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
I. As one of its earliest proponents commented in the inaugural issue of the predecessor to
The Yale Journal of International Law, "The New Haven school does not describe the world's different
community decision processes through a dichotomy of national and international law, in terms of the
relative supremacy of one system of rules or other interrelations of rules. Instead, it describes them in
terms of the interpenetration of multiple processes of authoritative decision of varying territorial
compass .... [I]ntemational law is most realistically observed, not as a mere rigid set of rules but as the
whole process of authoritative decision in which patterns of authority and patterns of control are
appropriately conjoined." Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law. An Invitation to
a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, I YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 30 (1974), quoted in Harold
Hongju Koh, A World Transformed, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. ix n.2 (1995).
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process in which the fundamental values of the international community help
to define the content of, and to legitimate, international legal rules.
2
These insights-groundbreaking at the time of the New Haven School's
founding-are today so well-entrenched in modem international legal theory
that they are often taken for granted. Indeed, in many respects twenty-first
century theory represents an elaboration upon the fundamental building blocks
of the New Haven School.3 For example, as their names suggest, both the
Transgovernmentalism and Transnational Legal Process Schools take as their
starting point the New Haven School's rejection of traditional dichotomies
between "national" and "international." These Schools emphasize instead the
increasingly transnational nature of law and lawmaking. 4 Moreover, the New
Haven School observed that states are the primary-but certainly not the
exclusive-actors in shaping international legal rules. As I discuss more fully
below, scholars of both transgovernmentalism and transnational legal process
take this insight a step further, explicitly recognizing the key influence of a
wide variety of sub-state or non-state actors on the international lawmaking
process. Thus, as a descriptive construct, the policy-oriented approach of the
New Haven School has had an important and lasting influence on twenty-first
century international law theory.
5
From its inception, however, proponents of the New Haven School were
interested not merely in providing a descriptive account but also in making
strong normative claims. 6 This is where the theory has been notably less
successful. According to the New Haven School, the legitimacy of
international legal rules depends on the extent to which they advance certain
normative commitments, or fundamental values, of the international
community. 7 But its critics contend that by making consonance with a certain
set of "fundamental goals" the yardstick by which legitimacy is measured, the
New Haven School effectively subordinates "law" to "policy." 8 And in so
doing, as one of its earliest proponents later acknowledged, the New Haven
2. See id.
3. Modem theory also draws heavily on the New Haven School's Harvard counterpart, the
Transnational Legal Process School. For descriptions of the various schools of international legal theory,
see generally Steven R. Ratner, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for
Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (1999). While the New Haven School's policy-oriented jurisprudence
focuses on "both what actors say and what they do," the Transnational Legal Process School emphasizes
the role of law itself "in constraining decision makers and affecting the course of international affairs."
Id. at 294.
4. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12-15 (2004) (discussing
the development and significance of "the disaggregated state" and transgovernmental networks in
transgovermentalism); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996)
[hereinafter Koh, Transnational Legal Process] (discussing development of transnational legal process).
5. See generally Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International
Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991 (1995).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. The theory thus gives credence to the notion "that a clear and specific rule of law or treaty
obligation may be disregarded if it is not in accord with" those values. Symposium, McDougal's
Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, 79 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 266, 271-72 (1985)
(remarks by Oscar Schachter).
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School's normative construct "virtually dissolves the restraints of rules and
opens the way for partisan or subjective policies disguised as law."9
As the Transnational Legal Process and Transgovernmentalism Schools
reach maturity a decade after their emergence, they offer the same promise,
and face the same challenges, as the New Haven School did in its heyday.
Both Schools have excelled in providing rich descriptive accounts of the
modem process of international lawmaking. The founder of the Transnational
Legal Process School, Dean Harold Hongju Koh, observes:
As sovereignty has declined in importance, global decisionmaking functions are now
executed by a complex rugby serum of nation-states, intergovernmental organizations,
regional compacts, nongovernmental organizations, and informal regimes and networks..
. New forms of dispute resolution, executive action, administrative decisionmaking and
enforcement, and legislation have emerged as part of a transnational legal process that
influences national conduct, transforms national interests, and helps constitute and
reconstitute national identities.'
0
As descriptive constructs, both transnational legal process and
transgovernmentalism (like the theories of their New Haven School
predecessor) have made significant contributions to scholarly understanding
of the formation of international legal rules, and of the transformation taking
place in the process of domestic compliance with those rules.
To date, however, proponents of both Schools have concerned
themselves primarily with providing thick descriptions of (and, in the case of
the Transnational Legal Process School, "strategic plans of action"'" for) the
"complex rugby scrum" of international lawmaking.12 They have shown less
interest in mounting a fully articulated normative defense of the theories. Such
a defense must address the various legitimacy questions that arise as the
"rugby scrum" takes the place of traditional lawmaking processes: for
example, as the key players become more diverse and the emerging legal rules
become softer in form and more complicated to identify and apply.
In short, the jury is still out on the value of transgovernmentalism and
transnational legal process as normative constructs, and much work remains to
be done in exploring these questions. Should global decisionmaking be the
result of a "complex rugby scrum"? Which subjects are appropriate for "legal
transnationalization," and which should be left exclusively in the hands of
domestic lawmakers? Should the "soft law" rules emerging from the rugby
9. Id. at 267. Moreover, the values identified by proponents of the New Haven School-the
maintenance and advancement of international public order, for example-seem too vague and
subjective to serve as useful yardsticks. Indeed, in the decade following its emergence, the New Haven
School's understanding of the international community's normative commitments or fundamental values
closely tracked U.S. interests-thus further undermining the normative claims of the theory. See id.
10. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2631
(1997) (book review) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?].
I1. The Transnational Legal Process School is particularly interested in the question of state
compliance with international law. In Dean Koh's conception, "transnational legal process presents both
a theoretical explanation of why nations obey and a plan of strategic action for prodding nations to
obey." Id. at 2655.
12. A notable exception is Anupam Chander's superb essay, Globalization and Distrust, 114
YALE L.J. 1193 (2005), discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 17, 63, 65, 69, 99, 138, and
146.
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scrum enjoy the same legitimacy and force as "hard law" rules emerging from
treaty negotiations and other traditional international lawmaking processes?
The goal of this Article is to explore the potential of transnational legal
process and transgovernmentalism as normative constructs, by bringing a
narrow lens to an increasingly influential part of international law's rugby
scrum: the role of transnational judicial dialogue among the world's domestic
courts. Both transnational legal process and transgovernmentalism envision a
key role for domestic courts in shaping international legal rules, and in
ensuring state compliance with international law. 13 Accordingly, proponents
of the theories urge U.S. courts to participate in transnational judicial dialogue
with foreign and international courts on a wide range of issues. 14 But
transnational judicial dialogue raises a host of questions surrounding the
democratic legitimacy of this transformation of the judicial role. Proponents
of transnational judicial dialogue claim that U.S. court participation in
dialogue will improve judicial decisionmaking, promote uniformity in the
development of transnational legal rules, and greatly enhance domestic
enforcement of international law. But they give too little credence to concerns
that transnational judicial dialogue can be deeply anti-democratic. In the view
of transnational judicial dialogue's critics, dialogue (particularly in the realm
of constitutional interpretation) can in fact create an "international
countermajoritarian difficulty," 15 in which domestic courts impose
democratically illegitimate "foreign" norms on unwilling-and
unsuspecting-domestic audiences.
In this Article, I explore the claims of both transnational legal process
and transgovernmentalism with respect to transnational judicial dialogue. I
first provide an account of the descriptive claims of both Schools with respect
to the role of domestic courts and transnational judicial dialogue in the
international legal regime. I explore to what extent those claims are based on a
particular set of normative commitments or assumptions, what those
normative commitments or assumptions might be, and whether their
normative accounts provide a basis for the "legitimacy" of norms created
through transnational judicial dialogue. I then consider how the theories might
go about addressing the international countermajoritarian legitimacy concerns
that some critics have voiced with respect to courts' emerging roles as
transnational actors. In so doing, I return to first principles in the debate over
the countermajoritarian role of courts: I explore whether one of the seminal
works on the domestic countermajoritarian difficulty-John Hart Ely's
13. See infra Part II. I elaborate on the role of transnational judicial dialogue in
transgovernmentalism and transnational legal process in Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and
Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93
GEO. L.J. 487, 497-501 (2005) [hereinafter Waters, Mediating Norms].
14. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(2006).
15. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 57, 59-61 (2004).
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Democracy and Distrust 6-might contribute important insights to the debate
over transnational judicial dialogue's legitimacy.
II. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE IN THE "NEW"
SCHOOLS: TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS
Both the Transgovernmentalism and Transnational Legal Process
Schools envision an important role for domestic courts and for transnational
judicial dialogue in the emerging international legal regime.
Transgovernmentalists, for example, view courts as key actors in developing a
"global community of law. 18 Transgovernmentalism begins from the premise
that the "unitary state" of an earlier international law era is breaking down
into its component parts: It is adopting a "disaggregated sovereignty" model
whose key building block is the transgovernmental network. 19 While much of
the transgovernmentalist scholarship to date has focused on networks among
regulatory agencies, 20 Anne-Marie Slaughter, a pioneering
transgovernmentalism theorist, has devoted considerable attention to the
emergence of transgovernmental judicial networks among the world's
domestic courts. 21 She argues that domestic courts, like their regulatory
counterparts, are developing robust worldwide networks on a wide range of
legal issues. In her work, Slaughter has chronicled the growing phenomenon
and importance of transnational judicial dialogue, which she refers to as
"transjudicial communication." Slaughter posits that by engaging in
dialogue, the world's domestic courts "are bound by multiple ties, both formal
and informal, but ultimately by none so powerful as a common commitment
to the rule of law. The meshing of that commitment, through increasingly
16. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
17. In applying Ely's insights to transnational judicial dialogue, I am building on and further
exploring the ideas presented by Anupam Chander in his essay, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE
L.J. 1193 (2005), in which he explored the relevance of Ely's theory to transnational legal process. This
Article will also draw upon my previous scholarship on transnational judicial dialogue. See Melissa A.
Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights
Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007) [hereinafter Waters, Creeping Monism]; Waters, Mediating
Norms, supra note 13.
18. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at
183, 186 [hereinafter Slaughter, The Real New World Order]. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Judicial Globalization]
(noting that activities of modem courts "are examples of judges looking, talking, and sometimes acting
beyond the confines of national legal systems, responding to the myriad forces of globalization. All are
also contingent on a deep sense of participation in a common global enterprise ofjudging, an awareness
that provides a foundation for a global community of law.").
19. See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 18, at 184 ("The state is not
disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts--courts,
regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures-are networking with their counterparts abroad,
creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order."). Slaughter has called
transgovernmental networks "a blueprint for the international architecture of the 21 st century." Id. at
197; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 177, 204 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
20. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,4 n.8 (2002).
21. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U.
RICH. L. REv. 99, 101 (1994) (discussing emergence of transjudicial networks).
22. Id. at 102.
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direct interaction, is more likely to establish an international rule of law than a
single international court."
23
Thus, in Slaughter's view, the emerging international governance of the
new world order primarily will be based not on international institutions-
including international courts-but rather on communication and coordination
among domestic institutions-and in particular, on transjudicial
communication among domestic courts. She argues, "International
government requires common formal institutions; international governance is
more likely to require communication and coordination among existing
institutions. Courts are a fine place to start."24
Slaughter predicts, moreover, that domestic court participation in
transnational judicial dialogue will produce a rich, diverse set of legal rules to
govern the emerging international legal regime. She argues:
The global community of law emerging from judicial networks will more likely
encompass many rules of law, each established in a specific state or region. No high court
would hand down definitive global rules. National courts would interact with one another
and with supranational tribunals in ways that would accommodate differences but
acknowledge and reinforce common values.
25
Transnational judicial dialogue among domestic courts thus serves as a
key component of the transgovernmentalists' "new world order." In the
transgovernmentalists' descriptive account, dialogue is an essential ingredient
in the formation of both formal and informal judicial networks. Dialogue thus
plays an important role in determining both how international legal rules are
shaped and how they are internalized into domestic legal systems. Moreover,
transgovernmentalists predict that the legal norms emanating from these
networks will be "deeply pluralist and contextualized," 2 capable of
accommodating national differences while reinforcing common values.
The Transnational Legal Process School, for its part, sees an equally
robust role for judicial dialogue in an emerging "transnational" legal system.
Developed principally by Harold Hongju Koh, transnational legal process
posits that international legal rules are shaped through a three-phase process
of interaction, interpretation, and internalization. In this view, "[o]ne or more
transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of interactions) with
another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm
applicable to the situation."27 Through repeated participation in this process,
"international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and become entrenched
in domestic legal and political processes." 28 Key to the
interaction/interpretation/internalization process are so-called transnational
"norm entrepreneurs" and "issue networks"-individuals and groups who,
through advocacy on behalf of a particular issue, help both to shape emerging
23. Id. at 137.
24. Id.
25. Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 18, at 189.
26. Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, supra note 18, at 1124 (explaining that judicial
networks are "forging a deeply pluralist and contextualized understanding of human rights law").
27. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 10, at 2646 (emphasis
omitted).
28. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 4, at 199.
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international legal norms and to operationalize those norms into domestic
legal systems.
29
Viewed through a transnational legal process lens, transnational judicial
dialogue serves several important functions. First, courts participating in
dialogue act as key "transmission belts" for the entrenchment of international
legal norms into domestic statutory and constitutional regimes. For example,
transnational norm entrepreneurs rely heavily on what Koh describes as
"transnational public law litigation"-that is, on legal advocacy before
domestic courts-to advance their strategic aims. For many norm
entrepreneurs, those aims include the incorporation of international law
(particularly international human rights law) into domestic law. Indeed, Koh
and other Transnational Legal Process School adherents have appeared
frequently as amici (or even as attorneys of record) before U.S. courts on a
wide range of issues, from the Haiti litigation 30 to the death penalty 31 to same-
sex marriage32 to the treatment of Guantanamo Bay detainees. 33 In all of these
cases, they have urged the courts to serve as "transmission belts"-that is, to
utilize international human rights standards, as interpreted by foreign and
international courts, in interpreting and applying U.S. law.
Second, domestic courts participating in dialogue serve as important
"law-declaring fora," articulating and interpreting norms for use by other
transnational actors in other fora. For example, norm entrepreneurs may seek
a ruling from a court, involving both a judicial articulation of the relevant
international norm, as well as a judicial declaration that the norm has been
violated by one or more transnational actors. The norm entrepreneur can then
use this judicial declaration as a "bargaining chip" to seek enunciation and
further elaboration of the norm in other "law-declaring fora"-for example,
legislatures, international organizations, or other domestic or international
• 34
tribunals. Thus, Koh argues, domestic judicial decisions "no longer represent
final stops, only way stations, in a transnational legal process of 'complex
enforcement,' triggered... by transnational public-law litigation."
35
Finally, in the Transnational Legal Process School's view, courts
participating in transnational judicial dialogue create "interpretive
29. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 10, at 2612 n.53, 2656.
30. See BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: How A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS
SUED THE PRESIDENT-AND WON (2005).
31. See Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448.
32. See Brief of Amici Curiae with Appendix, Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Public Health, 279
Conn. 447 (2006) (No. 17563), available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/Kerrigan-Mock/
Amici%20Briefs/internatinal-brief.pdf.
33. See Brief of Louis Henkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbls69
NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload5OO/234/AmicusCuriae-LouisHenkin-HaroldHongjuKoh-%2OMichae
IPosner.PDF.
34. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2371
(1991) (noting that plaintiffs engaging in transnational public law litigation have "a prospective focus,
fixed as much upon obtaining judicial declaration of transnational norms as upon resolving past
disputes," as well as a "strategic awareness of the transportability of those norms to other domestic and
international fora for use in judicial interpretation or political bargaining").
35. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 4, at 199.
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communities" 36 that engage in an iterative process of judicial interaction,
interpretation, reinterpretation, and domestic internalization of a given
international norm. The worldwide trend toward abolition of the death
penalty 37 serves as a case in point. Transnational judicial dialogue proved
instrumental in creating a judicial "interpretive community" that eschewed the
death penalty. Judicial opinions from powerful domestic and regional courts
like the European Court of Human Rights interpreted human rights treaties
and domestic constitutions to require abolition of the death penalty. Through
dialogue, other domestic courts around the world considered those opinions in
their own rulings, and adopted similar interpretations of the relevant human
rights treaties and of their own domestic constitutions. 38 Thus, through a
Transnational Legal Process School lens, domestic courts-through
transnational judicial dialogue-play a crucial role in shaping the emerging
transnational legal system, and in ensuring internalization of the transnational
legal system's norms into domestic legal systems.
III. NORMATIVITY IN THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS AND
TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM SCHOOLS: DOES TRANSNATIONAL
JUDICIAL DIALOGUE PRODUCE "LEGITIMATE" NORMS?
As descriptive constructs, both transnational legal process and
transgovernmentalism provide rich accounts of the role of transnational
judicial dialogue in shaping the emerging global legal regime. But do they
make normative claims regarding transnational judicial dialogue, as well? For
example, do the theories provide a response to critics who raise concerns
regarding the legitimacy of transnational judicial dialogue? In this regard,
there are at least two kinds of "legitimacy" claims that the theories might
support: first, a claim that the international legal norms created by
transnational judicial dialogue are "legitimate" on the international plane; and
second, a claim that the norms internalized by domestic courts are
"legitimate" on the domestic plane. I will first describe the normative
commitments or assumptions of both theories, and then explore to what extent
the theories might provide a normative defense of the legitimacy of norms
created and entrenched through transnational judicial dialogue.
With respect to the Transnational Legal Process School, the normative
commitments of its proponents are clear: They embrace normativity, arguing




For Transnational Legal Process School scholars, the goal is not simply a
transnational actor's compliance with international law, but rather, its
obedience. Transnational actors provoking an interaction with another actor
"seek[] not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new
interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal
36. Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 649-50
(1998).
37. Amnesty International's website provides a detailed account of the current status of the
death penalty worldwide. See generally Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last modified Apr. 16, 2007).
38. See Waters, Mediating Norms, supra note 13, at 506.
39. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 10, at 2646.
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normative system. The aim is to 'bind' that other party to obey the
interpretation as part of its internal value set."4°
Simply put, transnational legal process aims not simply to change
behavior, but to change minds. Thus under the Transnational Legal Process
School view, it is the dialogic process of transnational judicial dialogue
itself-of interaction, interpretation, and internalization among the world's
judges-that ensures the generation and proliferation of norms that are
"legitimate" on the international plane.41 Moreover, the norms internalized
into domestic legal systems through transnational judicial dialogue are
42legitimate precisely because they are the product of this three-step process,
which transforms "external sanction[s]" into domestic "internal
imperative[s].'4
The normative assumptions or claims of the Transgovernmentalism
School with respect to transnational judicial dialogue are less clear. Slaughter,
for example, suggests that her theory aims only to provide a descriptive
account of the emerging international legal system. Slaughter's conception of
dialogue is grounded in the neo-realism of her liberal internationalist approach
to international law, which by its own terms does not attempt to articulate a
moral theory of international law.4 She draws a distinction between
procedural rules and substantive law rules, and suggests that the former can be
value-neutral. Under this view, transgovernmentalism simply provides a
neutral, empirical account of transnational judicial dialogue and its influence
on domestic courts' emerging roles on the international plane. That empirical
account emphasizes procedural consensus among like-minded courts, rather
than assuming (much less requiring) moral consensus as to the content of the
• 45
norms created through dialogue.
Some critics of the Transgovernmentalism School's approach, however,
contend that both the theory and its claims regarding transnational judicial
dialogue are in fact grounded in an implicit set of normative commitments.
46
Alex Mills and Tim Stephens, for example, have argued that underlying the
transgovernmentalist conception of transnational judicial dialogue is a
commitment to the concept of dialogue based on a "free market of ideas. ' 47 In
Mills's and Stephens's account, transgovernmentalists assume that by
40. Id.
41. See Chander, supra note 12, at 1229.
42. See id.
43. See id. (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1402 (1999)).
44. Other scholars have criticized this aspect of Slaughter's work. See, e.g., Christian Reus-
Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 573 (2001). Slaughter's
neutral approach can be contrasted to other scholars who have attempted to develop a normative
construct for the emerging international legal regime. See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE,
LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
45. Slaughter and other transgovernmentalists argue that the emerging transnational judicial
dialogue will "likely encompass many rules of law .... National courts would interact with one another
and with supranational tribunals in ways that would accommodate differences but acknowledge and
reinforce common values." Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 18, at 189.
46. See Alex Mills & Tim Stephens, Challenging the Role of Judges in Slaughter's Liberal
Theory of International Law, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1, 27 (2005) ("Slaughter's focus on ostensibly
'neutral' procedure masks a commitment to a normative agenda ....
47. Id. at 28.
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participating in the market of ideas, the world's judges will, through
transnational dialogue, develop an optimal set of international legal rules.48 In
their view, transgovernmentalists have replaced international law's faith in
international institutions with faith in free market mechanisms. They argue,
"If Slaughter 'domesticates' international law, it is a domestication to the free-
market model of domestic governance." 49 Thus in the view of some of its
critics, the Transgovernmentalism School's stated commitment to a value-
neutral approach masks a deeper commitment to "the idea that moral
questions are susceptible to a market system, to a sort of economic
calculus" 5 -- one that is able to calculate moral values themselves.
Whether based on a normative commitment to a transnational "dialogic
process" or a judicial "marketplace of ideas," both the Transnational Legal
Process and Transgovernmentalism Schools share an optimistic faith in the
ability of domestic courts-through dialogue-to help shape an efficient and
just "new world order." What is less clear is whether either theory might
provide an adequate response to the numerous critics of transnational judicial
dialogue, who argue that dialogue produces international legal norms that are
illegitimate on both the international and the domestic planes.5' I will consider
both arguments in turn.
First, transnational judicial dialogue raises legitimacy questions on the
international plane: For example, are the international legal norms created and
shaped through the dialogic process representative of the consensus views of a
truly "global community of law"? Even assuming that the descriptive accounts
of transnational legal process and transgovernmentalism with respect to
transnational judicial dialogue are accurate, the content of the norms created
by such dialogue is normatively suspect. Transnational judicial dialogue, at
least as it is currently constituted, is at best a partial dialogue. The
"interpretive community" of domestic courts participating in the dialogue is
limited primarily to courts in those countries with strong traditions of
independent judiciaries and respect for the rule of law.52 Common-law courts,
with their rich tradition of citing and discussing foreign legal precedent, are
also more likely to be active participants in the dialogue than courts from the
civil law tradition. The result of this partial dialogue is that a relative handful
of courts in a handful of (mostly rich Western) countries have an outsized
influence over the dialogue taking place-and over the content of the norms
emerging from that dialogue. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that a small
number of domestic courts act as powerful "repeat players" in transnational
judicial dialogue on human rights issues: As repeat players in the dialogue,
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 29.
5 I. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 90 (2005); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (2004); Ernest A. Young, The
Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 148, 149 (2005).
52. Indeed, much of the scholarly research on transnational judicial dialogue focuses primarily
on courts in wealthy Western democracies. See, for example, the sources cited in Waters, Mediating
Norms, supra note 13, at 491-97 nn.19-40.
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they actively export their own countries' norms to weaker courts, who then
internalize those foreign norms into their own domestic legal systems.
53
The descriptive accounts of both transnational legal process and
transgovernmentalism themselves suggest likely shortcomings in the
legitimacy of international legal norms created through judicial dialogue.
Transnational legal process, for example, emphasizes the key role of
"transnational norm entrepreneurs" in articulating and shaping international
legal norms, and in operationalizing those norms into domestic legal systems.
But norm entrepreneurs are likely to be more active before some domestic
courts than before others. In the Canadian and U.S. courts, for example,
human rights law clinics and NGOs actively promote the application of
international human rights standards in interpreting domestic law; in many
other countries, however, such entities are much weaker or even non-existent,
and the opportunities for advocacy before domestic courts are much more
limited. In countries where transnational norm entrepreneurship before the
courts is particularly well-developed, judges are more likely to participate in
the global judicial conversation-thus increasing the likelihood that their
voices will become influential in that conversation.
Transgovernmentalism, for its part, implicitly recognizes the partial
nature of transnational judicial dialogue (though not necessarily its
implications for the legitimacy of the norms emerging from that dialogue).
The theory is based on the assumption that liberal democracies are more likely
to engage each other at the transnational level; thus, its proponents recognize
that "a true community of law is likely to be limited, at least in the short and
medium term, to groups of countries or regions with a strong domestic
tradition of the rule of law."54 In the Transgovernmentalism School's view,
the interpretive community of judges participating in dialogue is likely to be
similarly limited to like-minded courts hailing from liberal democracies. But
this partial dialogue has serious implications for the legitimacy of both the
dialogue itself, and the norms emerging from it. Just as "the attractiveness of
the concept of a 'communit of law' rather depends on whether one is inside
or outside the community," so too does the attractiveness of a transnational
dialogue taking place solely among courts who are "inside" the community.
Moreover, to the extent that "international" legal norms derive from such an
"insider" judicial dialogue, the legitimacy of transnationalists' claims that
those norms are products of a global moral consensus will be undermined. In
short, until all of the world's courts can participate in the global judicial
conversation on an equal footing, one must continue to question claims that
international legal rules emerging from that conversation have universal
application or enjoy universal "legitimacy."
In addition to international legitimacy concerns, transnational judicial
dialogue raises important concerns regarding legitimacy on the domestic
plane. Critics have charged, for example, that judicial dialogue may create a
53. See Waters, Mediating Norms, supra note 13, at 524-26 (describing norm export in death
penalty dialogue).
54. Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273,370 (1997).
55. Mills & Stephens, supra note 46, at 27-28.
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so-called "international countermajoritarian difficulty" when courts internalize
into domestic law norms created and shaped through dialogue. The domestic
countermajoritarian difficulty describes the problem of reconciling the need
for democratic institutions to be responsive to the popular will with the
concomitant need for a branch of government that can prevent the majority
from infringing on the rights of the minority. In domestic legal systems,
various kinds of checks ensure that courts do not overstep the proper
boundaries of their roles as countermajoritarian institutions. 56 Roger Alford
argues that an international countermajoritarian difficulty exists when
domestic courts attempt to mediate between conflicting domestic and
international norms.57 When domestic courts rely on international norms in
reviewing domestic law, there is a risk that the traditional countermajoritarian
difficulty will be exacerbated. For this reason, Alford contends that the
international countermajoritarian difficulty renders any judicial consideration
of international norms normatively suspect.58
Concerns about the international countermajoritarian difficulty may
undermine the normative claims of both the Transnational Legal Process and
Transgovernmentalism Schools. The Transnational Legal Process School, for
example, suggests that norms generated by transnational judicial dialogue are
legitimate within the domestic context because they are part of a dialogic
process in which courts and other domestic actors "interact, interpret, and
internalize" a given norm, thus turning mere "compliance" into willing
"obedience." In short, an internalized norm is legitimate because it is the
product of "buy in" from a variety of domestic actors engaged in the
transnational legal process. While this account may explain why domestic
political actors can legitimately internalize norms generated by transnational
legal process, it does not fully explain why courts may take on such a role.
After all, as countermajoritarian institutions, domestic courts may adopt a
given norm into domestic law before there has been sufficient
"internalization" or buy-in from other domestic actors-that is, before the
interaction/interpretation/internalization process has run its course and
produced a willing "obedience" to the norm in the domestic society as a
whole. At a minimum, then, the international countermajoritarian difficulty
suggests that domestic courts should not serve as the primary actors in
internalizing foreign norms-or that they should be cautious in internalizing a
given norm without significant prior engagement of other domestic actors in
the transnational legal process generating that norm.
The international countermajoritarian difficulty poses significant
questions for the transgovernmentalist account of transnational judicial
dialogue as well. To the extent that its critics are correct that the theory is
grounded in a normative commitment to a transnational judicial "free market
of ideas," the international countermajoritarian difficulty raises questions as to
56. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333 (1998).
57. Alford, supra note 15, at 58, 68 (citing conflicting international and U.S. norms in both
the hate speech and death penalty contexts as examples where the international countermajoritarian
difficulty is present).
58. See id. (discussing the misuse of international norms in constitutional interpretation).
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just how freely domestic courts may legitimately choose among the competing
"ideas," or norms, presented to them. In many situations, a court will face a
choice between "external" norms generated by transnational judicial dialogue,
and conflicting "internal" norms that are generated, for example, by the
executive or legislative branches. It is not entirely clear from the
transgovemmentalist account where domestic courts derive their authority to
choose external norms in the face of conflicting internal norms. Indeed,
Alford contends that courts lack such authority. He argues that whenever
international and domestic norms are in conflict, a proper understanding of
courts' limited roles-as well as concern for both domestic sovereignty and
federalism-should preclude courts from considering international norms
when interpreting the Constitution. 59 One need not go as far as Alford does to
recognize that the international countermajoritarian difficulty suggests a
circumscribed role for courts in choosing among the competing norms
available to them in the "free market of ideas." Moreover, in some instances
domestic courts may choose international norms that are primarily the product
of judicial consensus among the world's courts, rather than popular consensus
(as reflected in international treaties or foreign legislative or executive acts,
for example). In so doing, courts will subject themselves to criticism that they
are overstepping the proper boundaries of their limited roles as
countermajoritarian institutions-thus undermining the democratic legitimacy
of the foreign norms internalized by the courts.
In short, any attempt to develop either transnational legal process or
transgovernmentalism into a normative defense of transnational judicial
dialogue will require scholars to grapple with a set of obstacles surrounding
the legitimacy of the norms generated through such dialogue. The problem is
reminiscent of the obstacles that faced an earlier generation of scholars
developing the normative aspects of the New Haven School's policy-oriented
approach. The New Haven School's founders, Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal, began from the premise that international legal rules could be
founded upon a shared commitment to a "universal order of human dignity.
'60
They argued that the content of such rules could be discerned from a diverse
set of "fundamental values" shared by all the peoples of the world. In
determining these "fundamental values," they looked to a consensus among
the world's major systems, which, they argued, shared common goals even if
they differed in the "details of the institutionalized patterns of practice by
which they seek to achieve such goals." 6 1 Thus while decisionmakers might
share the same fundamental values, the policy-oriented approach "does not
59. With regard to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment, for
example, Alford argues, "Reliance on global standards of decency undermines the sovereign limitations
inherent in federal restraints, limitations bom out of respect for the reserved powers of the states to
assess which punishments are appropriate for which crimes." Id. at 6 1.
60. See generally Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 15 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Riesman
eds., 1981).
61. See id. at 19.
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promise or guarantee one correct, single answer to the question(s) posed., 62
Like the Transnational Legal Process and Transgovernmentalism Schools,
then, the New Haven School provides an incomplete response to the question
of the "legitimacy" of the world public order. As Anupam Chander has
pointed out, the New Haven School's fundamental values are "articulated at a
level of generality that leaves significant room for interpretation to the
decisionmaker. Such latitude in the interpretation of a putatively superior law
renders that law potentially undemocratic."
63
IV. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND THE PROBLEM OF
COUNTERMAJORITARIANISM: DOES ELY PROVIDE A SOLUTION?
As currently constructed, neither transgovernmentalism nor transnational
legal process provides a normative defense of the "complex rugby scrum" by
which domestic courts-through transnational judicial dialogue-are
developing international legal norms. Nor do their emphases on the "free
market of ideas" or on the "dialogic process" provide an adequate justification
for the legitimacy of the norms generated by transnational judicial dialogue.
Both theories require further elaboration to ground a normative defense of
dialogue. In this final Part, I elaborate on the theories' normative constructs by
returning to first principles with respect to courts' roles in the democratic
process. In essence, the final Part of this Article engages in a kind of thought
experiment regarding the application of a classic scholarly account of the
countermajoritarian difficulty to transnational judicial dialogue-John Hart
Ely's Democracy and Distrust.64 If a significant problem with the legitimacy
of transnational judicial dialogue is an international countermajoritarian
difficulty, might Ely's classic defense of courts' domestic countermajoritarian
roles provide a solution?
Anupam Chander was the first to recognize that Ely's work on the
countermajoritarian difficulty might help to address the normative deficits of
modern international law theory-specifically, of transnational legal
process. In attempting to fashion a theory of domestic judicial review that
was consistent with representative democracy, Ely argued that courts could
play a "representation-reinforcing" role that would strengthen, rather than
undermine, popular rule. 66 Ely's representation-reinforcing approach was
grounded in a two-part inquiry. First, does judicial review remove an issue
from the political process? If not, courts in exercising such review do not
threaten democracy, and there is no countermajoritarian problem present. If
judicial review does remove the issue from the political process (for example,
in the case of constitutional interpretation), a countermajoritarian difficulty is
presented. However, constitutional judicial review may still be legitimate-
62. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
316,334 (1999).
63. Chander, supra note 12, at 1231.
64. A full account of the application of the classic countermajoritarian difficulty literature to
transnational judicial dialogue would require article-length or book-length treatment.
65. See Chander, supra note 12.
66. ELY, supra note 16.
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and actually democracy enhancing-if it serves to protect "discrete and
insular minorities."
67
Chander argues that Ely's "representation-reinforcing" theory might
help to rebut critics' complaints of a democratic deficit in international law,
and to explain why transnational legal process is consistent with popular
sovereignty. Applying Ely's two-part inquiry, Chander argues first that, for
the most part, the creation of international legal norms through transnational
legal process does not remove issues from the majoritarian political process.
He identifies one arena in which transnational legal process does remove
issues from political processes: in the creation and internalization of jus
cogens norms (for example, a prohibition on torture). In that arena, Chander
argues, transnational legal process can still be justified as democracy
enhancing because jus cogens norms protect certain minority groups "in a
world where minorities are constantly at risk.
' 68
How might Ely's "representation-reinforcing" theory apply to
transnational judicial dialogue? 69 A translation of Ely's work to judicial
dialogue might begin with a two-part claim. First, on the international plane,
courts can play a "representation-reinforcing" role that would strengthen,
rather than undermine, the democratic legitimacy of international legal norms
created through judicial dialogue. Second, on the domestic plane, courts can
play a "representation-reinforcing" role that would help to legitimize their
roles as internalizers of norms created through transnational judicial dialogue.
To test these claims, I examine below two transnational judicial dialogues-
one statutory, the other constitutional. In the first dialogue, U.S. and foreign
courts develop a "rights-conscious" Charming Betsy canon to read
immigration statutes consistently with international human rights law. In the
second dialogue, the world's courts together shape emerging international
human rights legal norms surrounding the abolition of the death penalty. The
two dialogues provide examples of both of Ely's categories: judicial review
67. Id. See also Chander, supra note 12, at 1203.
68. Chander, supra note 12, at 1203.
69. Chander's analysis suggests only a partial answer. In translating Ely's theory to the
international law context, Chander focuses primarily on the role of transnational legal process involving
international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund).
Only one of his examples considers the application of Ely's theory to domestic courts-his exploration
of its application to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 524 U.S. 692
(2004). See Chander, supra note 12, at 1207. In Sosa, the Court held that the Alien Tort Claims Act,
which authorizes federal courts to hear claims by "an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States," authorized a "modest number" of causes of action based
on violations of customary international law. The Court directed lower courts, in discerning the content
of customary international law, to examine the "current state of international law," Sosa, 524 U.S. at
692, looking not only to "hard law" sources such as treaties, but also to "the customs and usages of
civilized nations," as developed and declared by the "works of jurists and commentators," id. at 733-34.
Chander argues that Sosa is an example of Ely's first category: judicial review of an issue that does not
remove that issue from majoritarian political processes. He points out, for example, that the Court made
it clear that Congress could "'shut the door to the law of nations entirely' through legislative action or
'modify or cancel any judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as such."'
Chander, supra note 12, at 1207 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731). In Chander's view, the Court's
approach to the Alien Tort Claims Act is entirely consistent with Ely, who acknowledged that courts'
statutory interpretations can simply be altered or overruled by subsequent statute. See id.; see also ELY,
supra note 16, at 4. The possibility of subsequent legislative reversal of the Court's interpretation of the
statute renders the decision-and its directive to lower courts to apply customary international law as
federal common law-consistent with democracy. See Chander, supra note 12, at 1207.
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that does not remove an issue from political processes, and is thus (in Ely's
account) unproblematic; and the much more difficult case where judicial
review does remove an issue from majoritarian political processes, thus
raising a countermajoritarian difficulty.
A. Dialogue over Statutory Interpretation: A "Rights-Conscious"
Charming Betsy Canon
Courts are beginning to engage in transnational judicial dialogue
regarding statutory interpretation, utilizing international human rights law to
interpret "ambiguities" in domestic statutes and to define the content and
reach of those statutes.70 The emerging dialogue is centered on well-settled
canons of statutory construction. Courts in the United States and elsewhere
have long employed a canon of statutory construction that assumes legislative
intent to act in a manner not inconsistent with a country's international law
obligations. In the United States, for example, the so-called Charming Betsy
canon holds that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.",7 1 U.S. courts have
applied the Charming Betsy canon to construe ambiguous statutes in such a
manner that they would not violate either international treaties or customary
international law.72 Other courts from the common law tradition have long had
their own analogues to the Charming Betsy canon.
73
Over the past decade, common law courts have begun to transform the
centuries-old Charming Betsy canon into a powerful judicial tool for
entrenching international human rights obligations into domestic law. By
developing a rights-conscious Charming Betsy canon, courts utilize treaties to
interpret domestic statutes consistently with international human rights legal
norms. A key emerging arena for the development of dialogue over the rights-
conscious Charming Betsy canon is in statutory interpretation regarding
administrative decisionmaking in the immigration context. In cases from
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, courts utilize
Charming Betsy to incorporate international human rights obligations into
their countries' immigration law. They do so by requiring administrative
officials to exercise their statutory discretion in accordance with the terms of
human rights treaties-in particular, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC)-whether or not those treaties have been legislatively incorporated
into domestic law. The cases also reveal the significant role that transnational
judicial dialogue is playing in the development of the rights-conscious
Charming Betsy canon in the immigration context.
70. 1 discuss the rights-conscious Charming Betsy canon in more detail in Waters, Creeping
Monism, supra note 17.
71. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (opinion of
Marshall, C.J.).
72. See, eg., Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) ("There
is, first, a firm and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in
ambiguous congressional action.").
73. See, e.g., Puli'uvea v. Removal Review Auth., [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 538, 542 (C.A.) ("[T]he
Court should strive to interpret legislation consistently with the treaty obligations of New Zealand.").
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The trend began in New Zealand. In Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,
the New Zealand Court of Appeal expressed the view that immigration
officials may have an obligation to take human rights treaties into
consideration in exercising discretion under the New Zealand Immigration
Act. 74 The appellant in Tavita faced deportation, but he had a child who would
remain in New Zealand. He argued that New Zealand's obligations under the
CRC required the immigration authority to make the best interests of the child
a "primary consideration" in exercising its discretion under the statute. The
immigration authority responded that it was not obligated to take the CRC's
provisions into account because the CRC had not been legislatively
incorporated into domestic law.
The court sided with Tavita, suggesting that administrative
decisionmakers may have an obligation to consider human rights treaty
obligations regardless of the formal domestic legal status of the treaties in
question. It emphasized the duty of the judiciary to interpret domestic law "in
the light of the universality of human rights." 75 Accordingly, it discussed
international human rights treaty law, along with decisions of the European
76Court of Human Rights regarding deportation proceedings. While it is
unclear from the court's decision what weight administrative decisionmakers
are required to give to international human rights law, the decision was
groundbreaking in that it read an immigration statute to require at least some
administrative consideration of international human rights treaty obligations in
exercising statutory discretion. 
77
A striking feature of the emerging rights-conscious approach to statutory
interpretation is that it is both a product of, and serves to further promote,
transnational judicial dialogue on human rights. The New Zealand Court of
Appeal's landmark decision in Tavita, for example, greatly influenced the
high courts of Australia and Canada in addressing similar statutory
interpretation issues. Indeed, the Australian and Canadian courts not only have
relied upon Tavita as precedent; they have developed and even expanded
Tavita's rights-conscious approach to statutory interpretation.
In Baker v. Canada, 8 for example, the Canadian Supreme Court
addressed in greater detail the weight that administrative decisionmakers must
give to human rights treaties in exercising their statutory discretion under
Canada's immigration statute, which allowed exemption of individuals from
deportation for "compassionate or humanitarian grounds." Baker faced
deportation and asked that she be allowed to stay in Canada to care for her
Canadian-born children. She argued that Canada's obligations under the CRC
required the Canadian immigration authority to make the best interests of her
74. [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.).
75. Id. at 259.
76. Id. at 259.
77. See Claudia Geiringer, Tavita and All That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding
Unincorporated Treaties and Administrative Law, 21 N.Z.U. L. REV. 66 (2004) (discussing subsequent
case law addressing the question of whether administrative decisionmakers must conform their decisions
to the requirements of international human rights law, or if it is sufficient that they take into account
human rights obligations in their decisionmaking).
78. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (Can.).
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children "a primary consideration" in exercising its statutory discretion.7 9 The
Court agreed in part, holding that while the immigration authority need not
make the best interests of her children a "primary consideration," it did have
an obligation to take their best interests into account. In interpreting the
statutory "compassionate or humanitarian grounds" language, the Canadian
Court adopted a presumption of legislative intent that was highly deferential
to international human rights law: "[T]he legislature is presumed to respect
the values and principles enshrined in international law, both customary and
conventional. These constitute a part of the legal context in which legislation
is enacted and read. In so far as possible, therefore, interpretations that
reflect these values and principles are preferred."80
As a result, the Court noted, "the values reflected in international human
rights law may help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation
and judicial review."81 It cited the New Zealand Court of Appeal's decision in
Tavita as support for this proposition. 82 Moreover, it stated that the
immigration authority had an obligation to exercise its statutory discretion "in
accordance with . . .the fundamental values of Canadian society." 83 And in
discerning "fundamental Canadian values," the Court discussed at length the
principles and norms articulated in the CRC.84 The Court concluded that while
immigration authorities need not make the best interests of the child a
"primary" consideration (as the CRC requires), they "should consider
children's best interests as an important factor."
85
The Australian High Court has taken Tavita's rights-conscious
Charming Betsy approach even further. In a highly controversial decision, the
Court relied on Tavita in holding that Australian ratification of the CRC may
give rise to a "legitimate expectation" on the part of Australian residents that
administrative decisionmakers will exercise their statutory discretion in
conformity with the terms of the treaty. In Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, 86 at issue was a statutory provision instructing
immigration officials to take into account a petitioner's family status and
"strong compassionate or other humanitarian grounds" in ruling on
deportation status. Teoh, a Malaysian citizen who faced deportation,
petitioned the Australian immigration authority for permanent resident status,
arguing that his deportation would cause severe financial and emotional
hardship for his Australian-born children. The immigration authority denied
his petition, and he appealed to the Australian courts, arguing that the
79. Article 3 of the CRC provides, "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." Convention on the Rights of the
Child art. 3, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
80. Baker, 2 S.C.R. at 861 (emphasis in original) (quoting RUTH SULLIVAN, DRIEDGER ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 330 (3d ed. 1994)).
81. ld.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 855.
84. The Court pointed out that "[t]he values and principles of the [CRC] recognize the
importance of being attentive to the rights and best interests of children when decisions are made that
relate to and affect their future." Id. at 861.
85. Id. at 864.
86. (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273 (Austl.).
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immigration authority was required under the terms of the CRC to make the
best interests of Teoh's children "a primary consideration" in assessing his
petition.
The Australian High Court agreed with Teoh's argument. Like the
Canadian and New Zealand courts, it emphasized the importance of
interpreting the legislative intent behind domestic statutes in accordance with
Australia's international human rights obligations. In particular, the Court
adopted a bold understanding of the meaning and consequences of Australia's
ratification of the CRC. It asserted that ratification of a treaty "is a positive
statement by the executive government of this country to the world and to the
Australian people that the executive government and its agencies will act in
accordance with the Convention." 87 As such, ratification of the CRC alone
served as "an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation, absent
statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that administrative decision-
makers will act in conformity with" the treaty.
Thus, according to the Teoh Court, the Australian government's act of
ratifying the CRC gave rise to legitimate expectations for individuals like
Teoh that immigration officials would exercise their statutory discretion in
conformity with the requirements of the treaty. Moreover, there was nothing
in the statute itself suggesting a legislative intent to repudiate Australia's
obligations under the CRC. Adopting such a rights-conscious approach, the
Court held that the immigration authority had an obligation to treat the best
interests of children as "a primary consideration" in exercising its statutory
discretion, as the CRC required. 89 Thus, in the Teoh Court's view, it was
simply requiring immigration officials to fulfill the promise that the Australian
government had already made to its citizens when it ratified the CRC: that
statutes would be read in such a way as to conform Australia's conduct to its
obligations under the treaty.
The influence of transnational judicial dialogue on the Charming Betsy
canon is even being felt in the United States, as plaintiffs in U.S. courts begin
to cite these foreign court decisions in advocating the adoption of a rights-
conscious Charming Betsy approach to interpretation of U.S. immigration
statutes. In Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales,90 the immigration statute in question
permitted cancellation of removal to aliens who could show "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" to family members. Cabrera-Alvarez, a Mexican
citizen, sought a cancellation of removal order to prevent economic and
emotional hardship to his two children, both of whom were U.S. citizens. Like
the petitioners in Tavita, Baker, and Teoh, Cabrera-Alvarez pointed to
provisions in the CRC requiring administrative officials to make the best
interests of the child "a primary consideration" in their decisionmaking. He
argued that under Charming Betsy, immigration authorities had an obligation
to interpret the statutory "exceptional hardship" language consistently with the
87. Id. at 291.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 292. The Court held that that the ratification of a treaty can give rise to "legitimate
expectations" even in individuals who are unaware of the treaty's existence. Id. at 291.
90. 423 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
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CRC. (Unlike Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, however, the United
States is not a party to the CRC, having signed but not ratified the treaty.)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began its discussion by
characterizing the Charming Betsy canon as a "presumption that Congress
intends to legislate in a manner consistent with international law." 9 1 It then
acknowledged that because the United States has not ratified the CRC, it is not
"the supreme Law of the Land" under the U.S. Constitution.92 Nevertheless,
the court suggested that it could take into account whether the immigration
statute complied with the terms of the CRC, "assuming that the unratified
Convention has attained the status of customary international law." 93 The
court then assumed for purposes of Cabrera-Alvarez's appeal that the CRC
had attained the status of customary international law, and that Congress
intended to legislate in a manner consistent with customary international law
(as reflected in the treaty's provisions).
Proceeding on these assumptions, the Ninth Circuit discussed at some
length various provisions of the CRC, as well as the Australian and Canadian
Courts' decisions in Baker and Teoh.94 It held that the immigration judge had
in effect made the best interests of Cabrera-Alvarez's children "a primary
consideration" in applying the statutory "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" standard. 95 Accordingly, it held that the immigration judge's
decision was in fact consistent with the CRC.96 Although the Ninth Circuit
ruled against Cabrera-Alvarez, its analysis suggests a willingness to engage in
judicial dialogue over the development of a rights-conscious Charming Betsy
canon-and to apply customary international law (even when based on
unratified human rights treaties like the CRC) to interpret federal statutes in
the appropriate case.
Courts utilizing a rights-conscious Charming Betsy canon have an
expansive approach to judicial incorporation of international human rights
treaty obligations into domestic law. They refuse, for example, to focus
exclusively on the question whether a treaty has been legislatively
incorporated into domestic law by statute (long the central issue for courts
from the common law dualist tradition). Instead, in Tavita, Teoh, and Baker,
ratification alone provides a justification for judicial use of the treaty in
statutory interpretation; the courts held that the act of ratification itself gave
administrative officials at least some obligation to take the treaty into account
in exercising their statutory duties. Indeed, in Cabrera-Alvarez, the court
suggested that even ratification was not necessary for a treaty to have
relevance in statutory interpretation: So long as the treaty has attained the
status of customary international law, the court suggested, administrative
officials might have an obligation to take its provisions into account.
Courts engaging in the rights-conscious Charming Betsy dialogue seem
to conceive of their own roles as mediators between domestic statutory
91. Id. at 1007.
92. Id. at 1010.
93. Id. at 1009.
94. See id. at 1010- 1.
95. Id. at 1013.
96. Id.
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regimes and international human rights treaty regimes. The rights-conscious
Charming Betsy canon "places the courts .. .in a position of oversight to
avoid the possibility of international liability for the country as a whole."
97
Moreover, through participation in transnational judicial dialogue, these courts
rely on foreign court decisions in shaping their roles as transnational
mediators.
Ely's representation-reinforcing theory seems to provide a defense of the
democratic legitimacy of transnational judicial dialogue surrounding the
rights-conscious Charming Betsy canon. The approaches adopted by the
courts in these cases fall within Ely's first category: judicial action that does
not take an issue outside majoritarian political processes. Indeed, by its very
terms the traditional Charming Betsy canon expresses deference to legislative
intent: It presumes, where a statutory ambiguity exists, that the legislature
intended to act in a manner not inconsistent with its nation's international law
obligations.
In keeping with this canon, the courts found ambiguity in the
immigration statutes and accordingly read the statutes in light of their nations'
obligations under the CRC. They may well have gotten it wrong. They may
have incorrectly assumed that the legislature intended to incorporate the
CRC's "best interests of the child" provision into domestic immigration law.
Indeed, they may have improperly found a creative "ambiguity" in a statute
where none exists. Thus while the courts' decisions may be legitimately
criticized as either judicial error or judicial overstepping, under Ely's theory,
these kinds of judicial failures in statutory interpretation do not necessarily
render courts' participation in dialogue on statutory construction
democratically illegitimate. In all of the cases discussed above, domestic
legislatures can correct the courts' errors or oversteps by simply amending
existing immigration laws or passing new statutes, making it clear that the
legislature does not intend to incorporate the CRC into domestic statutory
regimes.
98
Ely's theory thus helps to explain why transnational judicial dialogue
over statutory interpretation-and the norms that it generates-might be
legitimate. Courts, through the use of the Charming Betsy canon, incorporate
international human rights treaty obligations or (in Cabrera-Alvarez)
customary international law rules into domestic law. They do so by assuming
that domestic legislatures intended to legislate consistently with their nation's
97. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1128 (1990).
98. Indeed, a political backlash in Australia against the Australian High Court's decision in
Teoh suggests that the political branches have numerous tools at their disposal to respond to judicial
overstepping in employing the rights-conscious Charming Betsy canon. Shortly after the Court's
decision, the Australian Attorney General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a Joint Ministerial
Statement, taking the position that mere ratification of a treaty should not be interpreted by the courts to
give rise to an expectation that government officials would act in accordance with the treaty. See
Katherine L. Doherty et al., Complementarity as a Catalyst for Comprehensive Domestic Penal
Legislation, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 161 (1999). Moreover, members of the Australian
Parliament have periodically introduced legislation that would overturn the court's ruling in Teoh. See
Susan Roberts, Case Note, Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Ah Hin Teoh: The
High Court Decision and the Government's Reaction to It, 2 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 135 (1995), available
at http://www.austlii.org/au/joumals/AJHR/1995/l0.html.
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international law obligations (whether treaty or custom). Whether viewed
through the transnational legal process scholar's lens of "dialogic process" or
through the transgovernmentalist's notion that courts choose among a "free
market of ideas," courts' participation in dialogue enjoys "legitimacy," under
Ely's theory, precisely because the legislatures retain the option of
overturning the results of the courts' participation by subsequent statute. Thus,
in transnational legal process terms, the dialogic process does not end with the
domestic courts' ruling; instead, the political branches retain the option of
interceding in the dialogue and overruling the courts' interpretation and
internalization of a given norm. Thus in all of the cases discussed above, the
courts' decisions to apply international human rights law in interpreting
administrators' statutory discretion did not take the issue out of the
majoritarian political process. 99 It is thus consistent with a representation-
reinforcing theory of transnational judicial dialogue.
B. Constitutional Interpretation
One of the most important arenas for transnational judicial dialogue is in
the application of international human rights law to constitutional
interpretation. An especially rich and-in the United States, at least-
controversial form of constitutional dialogue has centered on judicial
development and internalization of international human rights norms
regarding the abolition of the death penalty. Courts participating in the death
penalty dialogue run the gamut, from supranational tribunals like the
European Court of Human Rights, 100 to domestic courts in developed
constitutional regimes such as those in the United States and the United
Kingdom,'1 1 to courts with nascent constitutional regimes in the former Soviet10210
bloc or in sub-Saharan Africa. 03 These courts have made a conscious effort
to place their own decisions within the broader context of foreign and
international law and, in so doing, have developed a rich transnational judicial
dialogue on the status of the death penalty under both domestic and
international law.
°4
A particularly striking aspect of the death penalty dialogue is the
extraordinarily powerful role the world's courts have played in shaping
emerging customary international law norms regarding the death penalty. The
international prohibition on cruel or inhuman punishment has played a crucial
99. Cf Chander, supra note 12, at 1206-08 (citing Ely's and Bickel's understandings of the
countermajoritarian difficulty as arising from the finality of judicial intervention).
100. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1063 (1989); see also Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1832, 1868-82 (2002) (discussing decisions of the U.N. Human Rights Committee and Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights regarding treatment of death row inmates from various Caribbean
nations).
101. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005).
102. Rulings and Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 1998, No.
II (Dec. 9), available at http://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1998/n8a1209a.htm (official English version).
103. See, e.g., Mbushuu v. Republic, [1995] T.L.R. 97, 118 (Tanz.).
104. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND
TORTURE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD'S COURTS (1996).
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role, providing courts with a common reference point around which to shape a
dialogue. 105 At the same time, as a result of dialogue the international
prohibition on cruel or inhuman punishment itself has evolved over time to
encompass real limitations on the death penalty. Courts ruling on the
constitutionality of domestic death penalty practices have cited foreign and
international law on cruel or inhuman punishment to inform their own
interpretations of their nations' similar constitutional provisions. Through this
dialogue, courts around the world have interpreted the norm to progressively
limit or even to strike down as unconstitutional domestic statutes permitting
use of the death penalty. 06
As I have discussed in a previous publication,10 7 the trend began with the
European Court of Human Rights' 1989 decision in Soering v. United
Kingdom,108 in which the Court held that the death row phenomenon-the
protracted delay typically involved in carrying out a sentence of death-might
amount to cruel or inhuman punishment. 10 9 Four years later, the Zimbabwe
Supreme Court followed the Soering Court's lead, holding that delays in
execution of six years or more violated the Zimbabwe Constitution's
prohibition against cruel or inhuman punishment. 10 Just a few months later,
the Privy Council (the highest court of appeal for several countries in the
Commonwealth Caribbean) cited Soering in reversing an earlier decision, this
time holding unanimously that the death row phenomenon amounted to cruel
or inhuman punishment under the Jamaican Constitution."' Other courts have
expanded upon the early death row phenomenon decisions, holding that the
application of the death penalty itself violates the prohibition on cruel or
inhuman punishment.1 2 The South African Constitutional Court, for example,
declared that any use of the death penalty violated South Africa's
constitutional prohibition on cruel or inhuman punishment. 113 In addition,
relying on these earlier decisions, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that
the death penalty violates constitutional guarantees of the right to life, 114 citing
what it described as "the international trend against the death penalty.""' 5 In
all of these cases, the courts used foreign judicial decisions and international
legal sources to inform, and to provide support for, their own interpretations
105. The prohibition is enshrined in major international human rights instruments and in
virtually every modem national constitution. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5,
G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; U.S. CONST. amend.
Vill.
106. See SCHABAS, supra note 104, at 13-56.
107. Waters, Mediating Norms, supra note 13, at 510-16 (discussing the following cases in
greater detail).
108. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
109. Id. para 92.
110. Catholic Comm'n v. Att'y Gen., [1993] 1 Zimb. L.R. 242, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J.
323.
Ill. Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. I (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jam.).
112. See, e.g., Reyes v. Queen, [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from
Belize).
113. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Aft.).
114. United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (holding that extradition of a suspect to
face the death penalty would violate the "right to life" provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
115. Id. para. 131.
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of constitutional prohibitions on cruel or inhuman punishment. In essence,
they used transnational judicial dialogue both to shape emerging customary
international law norms prohibiting the death penalty, and to internalize those
norms into domestic constitutional law.' 
16
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has joined the transnational
judicial dialogue on the death penalty. In Knight v. Florida,117 Justice Breyer
discussed case law from several foreign constitutional courts in urging the
Court to hear a claim that the death row phenomenon violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. In Atkins v.
Virginia,118 the Court held that a state statute permitting execution of the
mentally retarded violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. In
finding that the practice was no longer consistent with "evolving standards of
decency,""19 the Court cited (in a footnote) foreign authority prohibiting the
practice, acknowledging that "within the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved."' 120 More significantly, in Roper v. Simmons,
121
the Court struck down state laws permitting execution of juvenile offenders,
holding that such executions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.122 In
his opinion for the majority, Justice Kennedy cited the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and
other human rights treaties as evidence of an "overwhelming"' 123 international
consensus prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. He asserted that such a
consensus, "while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and,124
significant confirmation for our own conclusions." Justice O'Connor
agreed, noting that "the existence of an international consensus.., can serve
to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American
consensus."' 125 Advocates of transnational judicial dialogue have hailed the
Court's decision in Roper as a watershed event in U.S. courts' approach to
domestic incorporation of international law and in their willingness to
participate in transnational judicial dialogue on human rights issues.
Does Ely's representation-reinforcing theory support the democratic
legitimacy of transnational judicial dialogue on the death penalty? In the death
penalty dialogue, courts are helping to shape a customary international law
norm on cruel or inhuman punishment to include limitations on (or an outright
prohibition of) the death penalty. Moreover, these courts are internalizing the
international norms generated through dialogue into domestic constitutional
provisions. Thus, transnational judicial dialogue on the death penalty
implicates Ely's second, and much more problematic, category. Constitutional
116. I discuss this phenomenon in detail in Waters, Mediating Norms, supra note 13, at 516-29.
117. 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1993) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. 536 U.S. 304 (2004).
119. Id. at 321.
120. Id. at316n.21.
121. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
122. Id. at 578.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. See Harold Hongiu Koh, Mark Janis and the American Tradition of International Law, 21
CONN. J. INT'L L. 191, 194 (2005).
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courts participating in this dialogue are removing the issue from majoritarian
political processes-in effect, ending the "dialogic process" with respect to
interpretation and internalization of norms regarding the death penalty-thus
precluding the political branches or other domestic actors from further
participation in the dialogic process.127
Under a representation-reinforcing theory of transnational judicial
dialogue, judicial participation in the death penalty dialogue may still be
democratically legitimate if it serves to protect "discrete and insular
minorities."'128 Applying Ely's "discrete and insular minority" test in this
context, however, poses both practical and conceptual difficulties. The first
difficulty is definitional: Who, exactly, qualifies as a member of a "discrete
and insular minority"? The phrase is, at best, vague and impressionistic, and
its intended scope is unclear. 129 Consider, first, the adoption of a narrow
conception that roughly tracks the U.S. Supreme Court's post-Carolene
Products130 test for heightened scrutiny. Under this test, Ely's theory provides
a normative defense of judicial dialogue in fairly limited circumstances, and it
is not clear that it would authorize any participation in dialogue regarding the
application of the death penalty. For example, under the Court's
jurisprudence, neither juveniles nor those with mental disabilities seem to
enjoy "discrete and insular minority" status. 131 Thus under a narrow
conception of Ely's theory, judicial generation and internalization of
127. Theoretically, of course, constitutional judicial review does not remove an issue from the
majoritarian political process because there remains the possibility of constitutional amendment to
overturn a judicial ruling disfavored by political majorities. However, this option is of little practical
value as a majoritarian "override" of judicial review, given the extreme political difficulties presented in
the modem era in amending the Constitution. Moreover, as its decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997), demonstrates, the Supreme Court has taken a dim view of Congress's attempts to
invoke its own constitutional authority to override the Court's constitutional interpretations, even when
those interpretations seem to be deeply countermajoritarian. Congress had enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in an attempt to overturn a prior Supreme Court ruling interpreting
the Free Exercise Clause as establishing a modest nondiscrimination right for religion. Id. at 512
(responding to a Congressional attempt to overturn Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)). Relying on its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
"appropriate legislation" to "enforce" that Amendment, Congress interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
as establishing a much broader substantive liberty for religious exercise. RFRA was enacted with
overwhelming bipartisan support, unanimously in the House and 97-3 in the Senate. John P. LaVelle,
Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment ofEx Parte Young, Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial
of Indian Rights in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 31 Aiz. ST. L.J. 787, 931-32 n.620 (1999). In Boerne, the
Court struck down RFRA, holding that it violated both separation of powers and federalism principles.
521 U.S. at 536. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, I l I HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997) (discussing Boerne).
128. ELY, supra note 16, at 76 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938)).
129. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
130. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (noting that in reviewing statutes for
constitutionality, "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
131. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
legislation disfavoring mentally challenged individuals does not require heightened scrutiny); id. at 472
n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Minors cannot vote and thus might be
considered politically powerless to an extreme degree. Nonetheless, . . . I am not aware of any
suggestion that legislation affecting them be viewed with the suspicion of heightened scrutiny."). But see
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000) (declaring individuals with disabilities
to be a "discrete and insular minority" deserving of heightened protection).
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international norms protecting juveniles and the mentally challenged would
not be justified as representation-reinforcing. Under this narrow view, Ely's
theory would not offer a normative defense of the Supreme Court's
participation in dialogue in Roper and Atkins.
The situation is more complicated with respect to judicial dialogue
regarding the rights of death row inmates based on their status as prisoners
(for example, Justice Breyer's participation in dialogue regarding "death row
phenomenon" claims). 132 The Court's jurisprudence with respect to the status
of prisoners is unclear: At times, it has expressed special concern for
prisoners, suggesting that they are in need of heightened judicial protection;
but in other decisions it has apparently refused to recognize prisoners as a
special class entitled to heightened protections. 133 Some Supreme Court
Justices have asserted that prisoners as a class constitute a discrete and insular
minority,134 but the Court itself has never held that prisoners as a class are
entitled to heightened scrutiny.' 35 Thus, under a narrow conception of Ely's
"discrete and insular minorities," it is unclear that any form of judicial
dialogue regarding the death penalty--even dialogue based on capital
offenders' status as prison inmates on death row-would be representation-
reinforcing and thus democratically legitimate.' 
36
A broader conception of the phrase, however, would expand the
universe of judicial dialogue considered representation-reinforcing. Ely
himself suggested a broader conception of the phrase, asserting that "[t]he
whole point of the ['discrete and insular minorities'] approach is to identify
those groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no
apparent interest in attending."' 37 Chander echoes Ely in arguing that the
phrase "discrete and insular minorities" should be modified to encompass
"those [individuals] who need the channels of political change cleared for
them."'138 Under this broader conception, death row inmates would surely
qualify based on their status as prisoners. As Justice Stevens has commented,
"[p]risoners are truly the outcasts of society. Disenfranchised, scorned and
132. See supra text accompanying note 117.
133. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that unauthorized intentional
deprivation of property by prison guard did not constitute constitutional violation).
134. See, e.g., id. at 557 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Lower courts, for their part, have routinely rejected heightened scrutiny for prison
inmates. See, e.g., Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2000); Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460,
461 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997).
136. Translated to the transnational context, Ely's phrase suffers from the same vagaries that
have made it a problematic metric with respect to domestic constitutional interpretation. As in the
domestic context, which groups should qualify for minority status is very much in the eye of the
beholder (or advocate). See, e.g., Note, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect
Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501 (2003) (arguing for discrete and insular minority protection for
homeless persons); Patricia Abbott, Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community School District: Providing Special
Protection for Student-Athletes?, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 291 (arguing for discrete and insular minority
status for student athletes); Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual
Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 263 (1992) (arguing for discrete
and insular minority status for homosexuals); Sean C. Doyle, HIV-Positive, Equal Protection Negative,
81 GEO. L.J. 375 (1992) (arguing for discrete and insular minority status for HIV-positive health care
workers).
137. ELY, supra note 16, at 151.
138. See Chander, supra note 12, at 1234. Indeed, he argues that numerical majorities may, in
some instances, be in need of heightened judicial protection. Id.
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feared, . . . shut away from public view, [they] are surely a 'discrete and
insular minority."' 139 Under this more expansive view, transnational judicial
dialogue with respect to the death row phenomenon might be democratically
legitimate. By generating and internalizing international norms prohibiting
lengthy incarceration on death row, judges participating in the dialogue are
helping to "clear the channels of political change" for a group of individuals
whose interests tend to be ignored by domestic majoritarian political
processes.
This more expansive reading of Ely's representation-reinforcing theory
also suggests a response to one of the chief complaints of critics of
transnational judicial dialogue. They question the legitimacy of international
norms generated through transnational judicial dialogue because such norms
are the result of a partial dialogue, consisting largely of courts in liberal
democracies that enjoy a tradition of strong, independent judiciaries. But from
the standpoint of Ely's conception of democratic legitimacy, the partial nature
of the current dialogue may well be a net positive. To the extent that
international human rights norms are the product of dialogue among courts
from liberal democracies (as both transnational legal process and
transgovernmentalism seem to suggest), they are more likely to be protective
of minorities. Judicial internalization of such norms is thus consistent with
courts' roles as countermajoritarian institutions: Dialogue is likely to be
representation-reinforcing because it is protective of the rights of vulnerable
groups who need the courts' help in "clearing the channels" of domestic
political processes.
If proponents of transnational judicial dialogue seek to rely on this more
expansive conception of courts' representation-reinforcing roles, however,
they must be prepared for Ely's theory to lead dialogue in directions with
which they may not be entirely comfortable. In short, an expansive conception
of representation-reinforcing theory will serve to legitimize judicial
internalization of certain international norms that stand in sharp conflict with
well-entrenched constitutional rights. As an example, consider the rapidly
emerging international norm prohibiting hate speech. Increasingly, the
American constitutional regime stands alone in offering strong protections for
hate speech.140 The emerging international norm, drawn from both foreign
practice and international treaty law, espouses a very different conception of
speech, one that privileges protection of vulnerable minorities over the right to
freedom of expression. 41 Under a representation-reinforcing theory, U.S.
court participation in transnational judicial dialogue on hate speech-and
judicial internalization of international anti-hate speech norms-would be
democratically legitimate because they would serve to protect discrete and
insular minorities from injury. And yet participation in such dialogue would
fly in the face of deeply entrenched First Amendment rights-and, I would
139. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
140. See Helen Ginger Berrigan, "Speaking Out" About Hate Speech, 48 LoY. L. REv. 1, 2-4
(2002) (discussing foreign and international law prohibiting hate speech).
141. See id,
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argue, in the face of norms "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of [the
American] people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 14
2
An expansive reading of Ely's representation-reinforcing theory thus
provides a normative defense of various kinds of transnational judicial
dialogue with respect to constitutional interpretation, but in the end it may
prove too much. Its proponents emphasize that judicial dialogue is a dialogic
process involving internalization of international norms rather than
subordination of domestic norms. But to borrow a phrase from Peter Spiro,
such arguments "may mask what is, in fact, a partial displacement of
constitutional hegemony."' 143 By legitimizing the judicial internalization of
international norms into domestic constitutions so long as those norms are
minority-protecting, a broadly defined representation-reinforcing theory of
dialogue may exacerbate a trend toward erosion of the supremacy of national
constitutions as "discursive bulwark[s] against the encroachment of
international law."' 144 It thus may serve to sharpen, rather than to allay, the
fears of transnational judicial dialogue's critics, who predict that, "[i]n the
long run, international norms may be played, not merely as persuasive agents,
but as trumps."'
145
Do such concerns render transnational judicial dialogue illegitimate,
despite the normative justifications of representation-reinforcing theory? The
answer, in my view, depends in large part on the extent to which we trust
judges, in participating in dialogue, to "get it right." After all, like Ely's
classic response to the domestic countermajoritarian difficulty, a
representation-reinforcing theory of transnational judicial dialogue does not
demand that judges engage in a "dumb proceduralism."' 146 It need not require
that courts become mere passive recipients, or importers, of any international
norm that is protective of minorities. Instead, by focusing on the extent to
which the norms emerging from a particular dialogue are minority protecting,
the theory simply helps to describe a universe of cases in which participation
in transnational judicial dialogue may be appropriate, and in which domestic
courts may wish to consider international norms in interpreting domestic
constitutional provisions.
But with respect to transnational judicial dialogue, courts' roles as
countermajoritarian institutions must be balanced with other, equally
important considerations. In the final analysis, domestic courts draw their own
legitimacy as countermajoritarian institutions not from a "global judicial
community," but from domestic constitutional regimes-and indeed, from the
domestic polity itself. In shaping their participation in dialogue on
constitutional interpretation, then, it behooves courts to ensure, first and
foremost, that domestic constitutional regimes capture and express the
142. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993).




146. Chander, supra note 12, at 1234.
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"fundamental values" unique to their own societies. 147 Beginning from a
judicial orientation that is thus firmly rooted in the domestic plane, courts can
then legitimately "reach out" to the international plane, drawing on judicial




Both transnational legal process and transgovernmentalism emphasize,
above all, the dialogic quality of communications among the world's courts.
For transnational legal process scholars, courts participating in dialogue
engage in a dialogic process of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization.149 For transgovernmentalists, courts participating in dialogue
choose among competing norms in the judicial marketplace of ideas. 5° Both
theories reject any conception of transnational judicial dialogue as a vertical
process in which courts merely act as passive recipients of international legal
norms. Instead, they emphasize the co-constitutive nature of dialogue: Courts
"help[] ... to develop the norms that become part of the fabric of emerging
international society,"' 15 1 and, at the same time, help to ensure that these norms
"seep into, are internalized, and become entrenched in domestic legal and
political processes."' 5 2 Thus domestic courts, through their participation in
dialogue, serve as key mediators between the emerging international legal
system and domestic legal regimes.
Ely's representation-reinforcing theory, translated to the transnational
context, provides at least a partial normative defense of courts' emerging roles
as mediators. It offers a normative justification for transnational judicial
dialogue over statutory interpretation, explaining that such dialogue is
legitimate because it does not remove legal issues from the majoritarian
political process. ' 53 With respect to dialogue involving constitutional
interpretation, the story is more complicated. An overly expansive conception
of representation-reinforcing theory may well lead courts to import into
domestic legal regimes international norms that are inconsistent with the
"fundamental values" of domestic society. Representative reinforcing theory
can thus provide only a rough guideline for courts engaging in transnational
judicial dialogue, suggesting a universe of possible cases in which
147. See Waters, Mediating Norms, supra note 13, at 559 (urging courts, in mediating between
domestic and international norms, to consider the extent to which the international norm is consonant
with fundamental American values "deeply rooted" in domestic constitutional tradition).
148. Roper arguably provides an example of a constitutional court firmly rooted in its
orientation as a domestic actor. The Court first determined that there was a domestic consensus
prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders, and only after it had made this determination did it turn
to international authority to provide confirmation" of its finding with respect to domestic consensus.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). But see Waters, Creeping Monism, supra note 17
(discussing critics' contention that the Roper Court was in fact using international authority to buttress a
weak argument on domestic consensus against the juvenile death penalty).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 18-26.
151. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 10, at 2655.
152. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 4, at 199. I elaborate on the co-constitutive
nature of transnational judicial dialogue in Waters, Mediating Norms, supra note 13, at 501-05.
153. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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participation in dialogue may be democratically legitimate. To retain their
own legitimacy as domestic actors, however, courts must balance
consideration of minority-protecting international legal norms with domestic
norms that articulate and promote different, sometimes conflicting societal
values. Thus Ely's theory, properly understood, preserves for courts
considerable latitude in choosing, among norms generated through
transnational judicial dialogue, those norms uniquely appropriate to their own
domestic context.
